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case,) then we must find in the common law, the rules by which they
are to be established. The fundamental rules of evidence are, that
the best shall always be produced, and that every fact shall be proved
by the oaths of -witnesses, unless the law has prescribed some other
mode. The plaintiff had to show: 1st. That a justice had jurisdiction of his case by the law of North Carolina; 2d. That the person
who decided it, was a justice; and 3d. That he did in fact render
the judgment alleged."
"The certificates of the clerk and presiding magistrate of the
county were not under oath; nor are they by any enactment made
authentic in proceedings of this character. The law of North Carolina, by which the justices had jurisdiction of this case, might have
been proved under the provisions of the act of 1790, or according
to our precedents, by the production of the printed laws of that
State. In the same manner it might be shown that the person
who signed the judgment was a justice, if his appointment bad
been made by the Legislature. If the appointment was by the
governor, or by any other authority, then an exemplification of the
office books, certified according to the act of Congress of 1804,
would have proved it."
M.
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NIMANUS vs. cARMICHAEL.
1. Although the ebb and flow of the tide was, at common law, the most usual test
of navigability, it was nof necessarily the only one.'
2. Buthowever this may be, that test is not applicable to the Mississipi river.
8. The common law consequences of navigability, attach to the legal navigability
of the Mississipi.
'rom 2 Clarke's Cases in Law and Equity, determined in the Supreme Court of
the State of Iowa. We are indebted to the learned State Reporter for this case;
and regret that its very great length compels us to present only the head note and
some of the more important parts of the opinion. The -whole case is an elaborate
discussion of an important branch of law, and the arguments of counsel and opinion
of the court equally merit careful
datudy.-Edi. Am. L. Reg.
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4. The term navigable, embraces within itself, not merely the idea that the waters
could be navigated, but also the idea of publicity, so that saying wateis are
public, is equivalent, in legal sense, to saying that they are navigable.
6. Yet the navigability, in fact, is the leading idea, and is the ground of their
publicity.
6. The ebb and flow of the tide does not, in reality, make the waters navigable, nor
has it, in the essence of the thing, anything to do with it.
7. It is navigability in fact, which forms the foundation for navigability in law, and
from thefact, follows the appropriation to public use, and hence its publicity and
legal navigability.
8. The real test of navigability, in this country, is ascertained by use, or by public
act or declaration.
9. The acts and declarations of the United States declare and constitute the Mississipi river a public highway, in the highest and broadest intendment possible.
10. The rule that a grant is to be construed most strongly against the grantor, does
not apply to public grants.
11. The government being but a trustee for the public, its grants are to be construed strictly.
12. Grants of land by the United States, by patent, have relation to the survey,
plats, and field notes.
13. The common law knows but two lines-the mediumfilum aquze and high water.
If the stream be navigable, the boundary of the adjoining land is the one; if not
navigable, the boundary is the other.
14. By the common law, the riparian proprietor on navigable waters, owns to highwater mark only, and this rule applies to the Mississipi river.

Appeal from the Scott District Court.
This -was an action of trespass, for taking two loads of sand from
the soil of the plaintiff, McManus. The locus in quo is in Scott
county, and in the Mississipi river. The river, at this part of it,
and for nearly thirty miles, runs nearly from east to west. In the
middle of the river is Credit island, containing about two hundred
and sixty acres. Between Credit island and the main land, on the
north, or Iowa side, is a very small island, called Crane island, containing about seven acres. Off the east end of Credit island (it
being up stream), is Pelican island, containing about eleven acres.
In 1837 or 1838, the United States surveyed, and in 1840 sold,
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the public lands in Scott county. They surveyed the main land
and Credit island, but did not survey the other two small islands,
which overflowed; and which are now called Crane and Pelican.
The main land on the Iowa or north side, opposite Pelican island,
and the locus in quo, was sold to E. Cook, and Credit island to A.
H. Davenport. At a subsequent date, Crane and Pelican islands
were surveyed, and the latter sold to the plaintiff by patent,, dated
April 10th, 1849, in which the description is as follows: "Lot
number three and Pelica*n island, of section three, in township
seventy-seven, north of range three, east of the fifth principal meridian, * * * according to the official plat of the survey of the said
lands returned to the general land office of the Surveyor-General,"
&c. At the east or upper end of Pelican island, is a sand-bar,
which is exposed at low water, and which is the locus in quo.
From this sand-bar between high and low-water mark, the defendant
took two boat-loads of sand, taking it from the outside of the meanders of the suryey by the United States. The whole island is subject to overflow at unusually high water.
. The plaintiff has no other possession than a constructive
one,
arising from title, if he has this ; and the object of this suit is to try
his title to the sand-bar, outside of the lines of the survey, between
high and low water, up stream. The court found for the plaintiff,
and judgment was rendered in his favor, from which the defendant
appeals.
Whitaker and .Grant, for the appellant.
(ook and Dillon, for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WOODWARD, J.-This is the first case which has arisen in the
Territory, or State, of Iowa, raising the question of riparian rights
on the Mississippi river; and the questibn whether that river is a
navigable stream, in the broad sense, or only in a limited one; and
whether its shores or bed, or both, belong to individuals, or to the
public ? The cause might be disposed of briefly, but it calls for a
somewhat free and full examination, on account of its interest and
importance; on account of the fullness with which it has been pre-
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sented by counsel, arraying the authorities from all the States upon
all sides of the questions involved; and on account of the state of
the authorities; in which much has been erroneously taken for
granted-a bearing given to previously decided cases, which they
would not warrant-and unsupported inferences drawn from fair
decisions.
We are of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot maintain his
action. And in expressing our views, we will consider the following three propositions: First. Although the ebb and flow of the tide
was, at common law, the most usual test of navigability, yet it was
not necessarily the only one. Second. However the truth may be
upon the above proposition, that test is not applicable to the Mississippi river. Third. The common law consequences of navigability, attach to the legal navigability of the Mississippi.
First. Although the ebb and flow of the tide was, at common
law, the most usual test of navigability, yet it was not necessarily
the only one. The term navigable embraces within itself, not merely
the idea that the waters could be navigated in fact, but also the idea
of publicity, so that saying waters were public, was equivalent, in
legal sense, to saying they were navigable. Yet the navigability in
fact, was the leading idea, and was the ground of their publicity.
But on the other hand, there are in England and in this country,
many arms of the sea, which, though not navigable in fact, are so
legally. It is worthy of attention, that the ebb and flow of the tide
does not, in reality, make the waters navigable, nor has it, in the
essbice of the thing, anything to do with it. The fact that certain
rivers were accessible, and could be navigated by vessels of considerable burthen, always constituted the substance of the thing.
But, as in England, the tide waters, particularly the seas, were by
far the most important; and as all of the rivers of that country,
navigable in fact, were affected to a greater or less extent, by the
tide; and as the high and important admiralt jurisdiction was
always governed by this criterion, the ebb and flow of the tide
became the usual test. The nature of the admiralty, relating as it
did, to the high seas, where the king's authority had sole sway, and
to the arms of the sea, gave prominence to the tidal ebb and flow, in

McMA IUS vs. CARMICHAEL.

legal thought. But there is nothing in nature, or reason, to constitute this the only criterion. Blanchard vs. Porter,11 Ohio 143;
12 How. 454.
In the treatise on the law of waters, by Woolrych, 40 (margin),
he divides rivers into public and private. He says: "A public
navigable river frequently owes its title to be considered as such,
from time immemorial; by reason of its having *been an ancient
stream; but very many acts of Parliament have been passed, to
constitute those navigable.rivers, which were not so before. Waters
flowing inland, where the public have been used to exercise a free
right of passage, from time whereof the memory of man is not to
the contrary, or by virtue of legislative enactments, are public navigable rivers. This is the most unfailing test to apply, in order to
ascertain a common right; others have been attempted, and frequently without success." Thus he negatives the idea that none
are navigable but where the tide flows. And then he proceeds to
show, that all.waters are not navigable (in the legal sense) where
the tide does flow; and he cites the case of Mie Jayor of Lynn vs.
Turner, Cowp. 86, in which it was contended, that a river which
flows and reflows, and is an arm of the sea, is, primafacie, common to all; and therefore "it was urged that an action on the case
could not be sustained against the corporation of Lynn, for the nonrepair of a certain creek, because the tide of the sea had been
accustomed to flow and reflow therein; consequently, it was said,
this non-feasance was punishable by indictment only, because the
water must be deemed public. But this argument was treated by
the court as a fallacy; for they denied that the flowing or reflowing
of the tide constituted a-navigable stream; there being many places
where the tide flows, which are not navigable; and the place in
question might be a creek in the private estate of the corporation."
The language of Lord Mansfield, in that case, is emphatic: " H ow
does it appear that this is a navigable river ? The flowing and
reflowing of the tide does not make it so."
In Miles vs. Bose, 5 Taunt. 706, Gibbs, 0. J., says that the flowing of the tide, though not absolutely inconsistent with a right of
private property in a creek, is strong primafacie evidence of its
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being a public navigable river; and Heath, J., expresses the same
opinion. And in Bex vs. Montague, 4 B. & C, 598, in 1825, Bayley, J., says: "The strength of this prima facie evidence must
depend upon the situation and nature of the channel. If it is a
broad and deep channel, calculated for the purposes of commerce,
it would be natural to conclude that it has been a public navigation ; but if it is a petty stream, navigable only at certain periods
of the tide, and then only for a very short time, and by very small
boats, it is difficult to suppose that it ever has been a public navigable channel." And Holroyd and Littledale, Justices, concur:
10 E. C. L. 414. And Woolrych, again, makes the following conclusion: "The circumstance, therefore, of the flow and reflow of
the tide, is one of the strongest in support of a public right; but
so far from being conclusive, we have mentioned a case in which
such a test has been found to be fallible. Public user, for the purposes of commerce, is, consequently, the most convincing evidence
of the existence of a navigable river," &c. It seems clear, then,
that even taking the doctrine of the English books, whilst the flow
of the tide became, and was spoken of as the usual test, yet it was
not this which constituted a stream navigable, nor was it the only
test; and that sometimes even this failed. See Hale's De Jure
Maris, in 6 Cow. 539.
Second. However the truth may be upon the first proposition,
the flow and reflow of the tide is not applicable to the Mississippi,
as a test of its navigability. And third: The common law consequences of navigability, attach to the legal navigability of the
Mississippi river. The arguments and authorities upon these two
propositions, being in a great measure identical, they must be considered together.
The thought has been before suggested, that as a real and virtual
test, the tide is a merely arbitrary one, and is not supported by
reason; since many waters.where the tide flows are not in fact navigable, and many where it does not flow, are so. It is navigability
in fact, which forms the foundation for navigability in law; and
from the fact follows the appropriation to public use, and hence
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its publicity and legal navigability.

It is true, that this legality
attaches to some waters which do not possess the requisite quality
in fact, but this arises from their relation to the high seas, and to
admiralty, and from the difficulty of making an hundred exceptions.
It is impossible to bring the mind to an approval, when we attempt
to apply to the rivers of this country, stretching up to three thousand miles of extent-flowing through or between numerous independent States-and bearing a commerce which competes with that
of the oceans-a test which might be applicable to an island not
so large as some two of our States; and to streams whose utmost
length was less than three hundred miles, and whose outlet and
fountain, at the same time, could be within the same State jurisdiction. In England, or in Great Britain, the chief rivers are the
Severn, Thames, Kent, Humber, and Mersey; the latter of which
is about fifty, and the first about three hundred miles in length, and
of this (the Severn) about one hundred miles consists of the British
channel. The world-renowned Thames, has the diminutive proportions of two hundred miles. And of even these lengths, not the
whole is navigable. Thus, it will be seen, that these chief rivers of
good old England, range in extent with our Connecticut, Merrimac,
Hudson, Allegany, Monongahela, Cedar, Iowa, and Des-Moines,
and bear a proportion of one to twenty, when compared with the
greater rivers of this continent.
The courts in the States of Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut,
New York, Maryland, Ohio, Illinois and Mississippi, have adopted
the common law rule, with more or less directness and fullness.
The cases are very fully collected by the counsel, and we have seen
and examined nearly all of them. In the most of those from the
northeastern States, the subject is discussed very little; but they
simply assume the common law rule as the one to decide by, and
look no farther. It is conceived that there is no case in the New
England States, which requires comment. In New York, the subject has received a good deal of attention in the cases of 7arickA vs.
Smith, 5 Paige, 137 ; Same vs. Same, lb. 547 ; Ex parte Jennings,
6 Cowen, 53T, in a note to whichis published a part of Ld. 1Iale's
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Treat. Je Jire iiaris; Canal Corn. vs. Thie People, 5 Wend. 447;
People vs. Canal Cow., 13 Ib.358; Canal Apyr's vs. The People,
17 Ib.571; Hewlett vs. Pearsall,20 lb. 111; Pearsallvs. Post,
22 Ib.425; Canal Coin. vs. Ziempshall, 26 Ib.404; Gould vs.
.lludson I. B. . Co., 2 Seld. 522.
The cases in Pennsylvania, have been cited in the books, on both
sides of this question ; but it is conceived that there has been a
misapprehension of them, in citing them in favor of the old rule.
Thus, the American editors of Smith's Leading Cases, in their note
to 2d vol. 193, say, that "so far as the tide ebbs and flows, the
ownership of the soil to low-water mark, is in the proprietor of the
adjoining bank," and cite several Pennsylvania cases, among which
are Hart vs. Hill, I Whart. 124; and Ball vs. Slack, 2 Ib.508.
In that State, the courts have recognized the right of several fisheries, as arising from ancient custom and from statute; but they
have held no doctrine of a right to low water, any farther than as
relating to and connected with, such fishing. Thus Hart vs. Hill,
was for a direct interruption of the right of a several fishery, and
the court say, "and first, a fishery is in the river, and is not the
space between high and low water, though the use of that space
may be necessary in the use of it, and may be included in the term
fishery." It is true that they use general language, which implies
more than this, but it is to be taken in reference to the case before
them.
In Ball vs. Slack, 2 Whart. 508, the reporter's abstract says:
"It seems that the owners on the Delaware and Schuylkill, have a
right to the land between high and low water, subject," &c. It
may be doubted whether even this is warranted by the opinion, but
admitting that it is, the law there is distinctly settled to the contrary, in carson vs. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, and in Shunk vs. Schuiyl.
.Stav. Co., 14 S.& R. 71. Many inaccurate expressions have been
used in the cases in that State, relating to fisheries, which have led
to confusion, but the subject is much cleared in the two cases above
cited. And both Pennsylvania and Connecticut recognize a right,
either from statutes or local common law, to build wharves, &c., for
commercial purposes. The case of Chapman vs. Kfimlall, 9 Conn.
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38, announces the rule to be, that owners on navigable rivers own
to high-water mark. They say: "The usage of the owners of
land to high-water mark, to wharf out against their own land, has
never been disputed. This is our common law." Time will not
permit the examination of the remainder of the cases cited in the
above note, but it is conceived, with deference, that they do not
show such a rule to be established-at least outside of their own
State.
The case of Mullanphy vs. Daggett, 4 Mo. 343, is not to be cited
in this class, for it stands upon the express ground, that the Spanish
government granted to the watei. And .Browne vs. Kennedy, 5
Har. & John. 195, is hardly to be ranked here, for the basis of it
is the king's grant to the lord-proprietor; -which the court considered
as carrying the right to the shore, and which the proprietor afterwards granted away. In the above cases, from the most of the
foregoing States, the consideration arising from the common law
rule, and those, connected with it, to which we have before alluded,
seem to have carried the minds of the courts, as of course, for there was
nothing in their circumstances to awaken the question of the applicability of the old rule. And, besides, the earlier of them set the
rule down, before the development of the western country had shown
the vast public importance of our greater rivers, as amounting to inland seas. It is also worthy of attention, that these same cases
hold, that the rule does not extend to larger bodies of fresh and
standing waters, namely, the lakes which are within the limits of
New Hampshire. They carry the adjacent owner's right to the
water, but not ad medium. See .The State vs. Gilmanton, 9 N. H.
463; Canal Comrs. vs. The People, 5 Wend. 447; and Hale's
Treat. in 6 Cow. 545, is cited.
But when we approach those States which, while they border
upon the great western rivers, have still been held more or less by
the common law rule, we are compelled to give very considerate
attention. 'This has been the case with Ohio. The case of Blanchard

vs. Collins et al., 11 Ohio, 138, old series, in 1841, if regarded as
one of the first settling this question, is certainly not a fully considered one. The common law rule is at once recognized. There
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is not a word in relation to the character of that river, the Ohionothing in relation to the ordinance of 1787, and its meaning and
effect-and nothing concerning the laws and practice in respect to
the survey and sale of the public lands. It stands chiefly on the
two cases in New York-The People vs. Platt,17 Johns. 195, and
Hooker vs. Cummings, 20 Ib. 90-and its own case, Gavitt vs.
Chambers, 14, Ohio, 643. It also relies, partly, upon the cases of
Cooper vs. Smith, 9 S. & R. 26, and Shunk vs, Schuylkill Nav.
Co., 14 Ib. 74, which it claims to teach, that the riparian proprietor
owns to the water, but not ad medium filum; and thus neither following the common law, nor wholly abrogating it. We conceive
that the court gave these two cases a meaning which they do not
inculcate.
In accordance with this general and strong tendency, of the common law, several States have refused to apply the narrow rule to
their large waters. As early as 1810, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Carson vs. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475; took the
lead. The case came up upon exceptions taken to a charge to a
jury by Chief Justice Tilghman, concerning a right of fishing.
He said: "The several acts of assembly declaring these rivers to
be highways, and regulating the fisheries in them, are incompatible
with the common law right. But the common law principle concerning rivers, even extended to America, would not apply to such
a river as the Susquehanna, which is a mile wide, and runs several
hundred miles through a rich country, and which is navigable, and
is actually navigated by large boats. If uch a river had existed
in England, no such law would ever have been applied to it. Their
streams, in which the tide does not ebb and flow, are small." It
appears from the opinion of Brackenridge, J., that the grants
sometimes extended to the water, and called for it, and even where
they did so, they were held not to go to the middle of the stream;
nor did they go to the water, unless the grant was explicit.
This case was followed by Shunc vs. Schuyllill Navigation Co.,
14 S. & R. 71, in 1826; Bird vs. Smith, 8 Watts, 434; Union
Canal Co. vs. Landis, 9 Watts, 228, in 1840; all of which recog-
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nize the same doctrine. There does not seem to have been advanced
in Pennsylvania, a claim to the centre of these large rivers, nor
even to the shore. Two of the above cases, arise on claims to the
exclusive right to fish with seines in the pools made or kept in order
by individuals, founded upon a supposed ancient usage. But the
claim of such a right was rejected.
North Carolina, also, in 1828, set aside the common law rule, as
inapplicable. And the only thing which gives the riparian owner,
in that state, a right down, to the water, is the express declaration
of their ancient acts of 1715 (or 1765) and 1777, relating to surveys and sales; and their otherwise total exemption from the common law private rights, stands upon the ground' that they are
declared to be highways, as the acts and laws of the United States
have declared other rivers. Tennessee follows the decision in North
Carolina, as subject to the same acts of assembly.
In the case of Cates vs. Wadlington, 1 McCord, 583 (356 top),
in 1822, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, by Nott, J., says,
"But that rule (the common law) will not do in this State, where
our rivers are navigable several hundred miles above the flowing of
the tide." And they say this in close connection with the assertion,
that there is no legislative act declaring which, 'or whether any, of
their rivers are to be considered as public or navigable, so that the
subject was free from any kind of constraint, except the common
law rule.
The subject received more elaborate attention in The Mayor, &e.,
of Mobile vs. Bslava, 9 Porter, 578, in 1840, than in nearly any of
the other cases; and it is here viewed with mere reference to the
ordinances and laws of the United States, which are scarcely alluded
to in any one of the foregoing cases, but without which, we conceive
it impossible to reach the merits of the question. The common
law rule alone seems to have absorbed the attention, in the consideration of the cases, whilst the treaties, ordinances and laws of
the United States, have been overlooked or passed by in silence.
It is now necessary to see how far the matter has been discussed
or settled by the federal courts.
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Tyler vs. Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 397-400, related to the Pawtucket
river, a small river flowing in part of its course between Massachusetts and Rhode Island; but the controversy was between individuals. Judge Story, without any discussion, assumes the application of the common law rule to that part of it which was above the
tide water.
Bowman's Devisees and Burnly v. Wathen et al., 2 McLean, 376,
is cited on both sides of the question, but we think it a strong authority against the application of the common law rule. Judge McLean
says: "We apprehend that the common law doctrine as to the navigableness of streams, can have no application in this country; and
that the fact of navigableness does in no respect depend upon the
ebb or flow of the tide. On navigable streams, the riparian right,
we suppose, cannot generally extend beyond high-water mark."
The doubt as to the application of this case, as an authority, arises
on the next passage, in which he says: "But in the present case,
this inquiry is not important. It is enough to know that the riparian right on the Ohio river extends to the watir," and that "the
proprietor has the right of fishing, of ferry, and every other right
which is properly appurtenant to the soil." The doubt is, whether
the learned judge means this latter as a proposition holding true of
the Ohio generally, or of grants standing, as the one before him
did. He may have intended it of the Ohio generally, upon the
strength of the cases before cited from that State; but strong
against this construction, is the assertion that the proprietor has
the right of fishing! Now, no one has ever gone so far as to claim
a several fishery in that, or any other of the great western rivers;
and the Ohio cases, as well as Handly's Lessee vs. Anthony, 5
Wheat. 374, negative such a right; for they hold that as the State
of Ohio extends to low-water mark only, of consequence no grant
by, or in the State, can extend farther; and the right of a several
fishery implies, ex necessitate, a title or right usque filum aquce.
There is a view which renders Judge McLean's remarks entirely
harmonious; that is, considering his last remark as made in reference to the right or title before him. For directly in connection
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with the foregoing thought, he proceeds thus: "In coming to this
conclusion, we have deemed it unnecessary to look particularly into
the laws of Virginia, under which the title in question was &erived,"
&c. "The title of Isaac Bowman (one of the complainants) was
derived from the State of Virginia, not only before Indiana was
known as a territory, but before the organization of the Northwestern Territory. His rights, whatever they were, can have been
in no respect affected by the direct act of the territorial government,
or of the State government which succeeded it."
We desire to add a passage from the opinion of Chief Justice
Taney, in the case of the Propeller qenesee Chief vs. Fitzhugh, 12

How. 443, in 1851, in which case was considered the question of
the extension of the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States to
navigable waters, other than the tide waters. "INow there is nothing," he says, "in the ebb and flow of the tide, that makes the
waters peculiarly suitable for admiralty jurisdiction, nor anything
in the absence of a tide, that renders it unfit. If it is a public
navigable water, on which commerce is carried on between different
states or nations, the reason for the jurisdiction is precisely the same;
and if a distinction is made on that account, it is merely arbitrary,
without any foundation in reason; and, indeed, would seem to be
inconsistent with it. In England, the writers and courts always
speak of the jurisdiction as confined to tide water. And' this definition, in England, was a sound and reasonable one, because there
was no navigable -stream in the country, beyond the ebb and flow
of the tide, nor any place 'where a port could be established to carry
on trade with a foreign nation, and where vessels could enter or
depart with cargoes. In England, therefore, tide water and navigable water, are synonymous terms, and tide water, with a few small
and unimportant exceptions, meant nothing more than public rivers,
as coptradistinguished from private ones; and they took the ebb
and flow of the tide as the test, because it was a convenient one, and
more easily determined the character of the river. At the time of
the adoption of our constitution, the English definition was equally
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proper here. In the old thirteen States, the far greater part of the
navigable waters are tide waters, &c. * * * * The courts of the
United Otates, therefore, naturally adopted the English mode of
defining a public river, and consequently the boundary of admiralty
jurisdiction. They measured it by tide water. And that definition,
having found its way into our courts, became, after a time, a familiar
mode of describing a public river, and was repeated as cases occurred, without particularly examining whether it was as universally
applicable in this country as in England. If there were no waters
in the United States which are public, as coatradistinguished from
private, except where there is tide, then unquestionably, here as
well as in England, tide water must be the limit of admiralty
power. And as the English definition was adopted in our courts,
and constantly used in judicial proceedings, and forms of pleading,
borrowed from England, the public character of the river was in
process of time lost sight of, and the jurisdiction of the admiralty
treated as if it were limited by the tide. The description of a public
navigable river, was substituted in place of the tbing intended to
be described. And under the natural influence of precedents and
established forms, a definition, originally correct, was adhered to
and acted on, after it had ceased, from a change of circumstances,
to be the true description of public waters."
Judgment reversed.

I the 8upreme Court of Ohio, -December Term, 1856.
REUBEN H. THURSTON AND THOMAS HAYS vs. WILLIA7%I LUDWIG.
A verbal agreement, to be effectual as a waiver, variation, or change in the stipulations of a prior written contract between the parties, must rest upon sonic new
and distinct legal consideration, or must have been so far executed or acted upon
by the parties, that a refusal to carry it out would operate as a fraud upon one
of the parties.

Petition in error, to reverse the judgment of the District Court
of Crawford county.
The original action was assumpsit, brought by the plaintiffs in
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error against the defendant in error, in the Court of Common Pleas
of Crawford county, March 17, 1852. The plaintiffs declared on a
-written contract as follows, viz :
"This is to certify that Win. Ludwig agrees to deliver to Thurston & Hays, from 300 to 500 good merchantable stock hogs, none
to weigh less than 70 lbs., to be delivered in Delaware, Ohio, from
1st to 5th of Mlarch next, for which Thurston & Hays agree to give
$311'J° per hundred, gross weight, on delivery.
W9. LUDWIG,
THURSTON

& HAYS.

Bucyrus, Jan. 13, 1852."
The defendant pleaded the general issue, with a notice, that, on the
trial, he would give in evidence and insist in bar of the action, that
after the execution of the contract declared on, and on the same day,
to wit, the 13th day of January, 1852, said contract was varied by
a verbal agreement between the -plaintiffs and the defendant,
whereby the plaintiffs, for a good and sufficient consideration,
promised to make the defendant an advancement of money on said
written contract, before the 5th day of March, 1852, to wit, on the
first day of February, of that year; and that in default of such
advancement of money, the defendant was discharged from all
liability on said written contract; and that the plaintiffs neglected
and refused to make such advancement of money to the defendant;
whereby the defendant has become discharged from all liability to
the plaintiffs on said written contract.
After a trial in the Common Pleas, the cause was appealed to
the District Court. And at the A-ugust term of the District Court,
1852, the intervention of a jury having been waived, and the cause
submitted to the court, the plaintiffs, to maintain the issue on their
part, gave in evidence the written contract declared on, and also
evidence proving the failure of the defendant to deliver the bogs;
that, at the time specified for the delivery, stock hogs, such as the
contract called for, were worth at Delaware from $3.0. to $3-75
per hundred weight gross. And-it appeared in the evidence, that
after the written contract had been executed between the parties on
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the 13th January, 1852, the defendant, Ludwig, told the plaintiff,
Thurston, that he would expect an advancement of money on the
contract, before the delivery of the hogs, insisting that it was customary among stock dealers to do so. To this Thurston replied,
that it was not his custom, and that he did not expect to make any
such an advance. Ludwig, however, insisted on the advance, and
Thurston finally said that he would either go himself or send to
Bucyrus, sometime about the first of February, and would then
advance to Ludwig $150 or'$200 on the contract. This parol
agreement was not, however, either inserted in the written contract,
or reduced to writing. It also appeared in evidence, that plaintiffs,
Thurston and Hays, were partners in business in Delaware, Ohio ;
and that about the last of January, or first of February, after the
making of this contract, the son of the plaintiff, Thurston, was sent
to Ludwig, to make a contract for the purchase of more hogs, and
also to see about the prospect of the delivery of those already contracted for, when Ludwig declined to contract for the delivery of
any more hogs, but said that he would have those already contracted
for, ready for delivery at the time specified; but said nothing about
the advance of money on the contract by Thurston. It also appeared,
that about the last of February, Thurston sent a man to Ludwig to
make further inquiry about the hogs, and to assist in driving them
to Delaware, when Ludwig refused to deliver the hogs, assigning as
his reason therefor, that Thurston had not kept his promise to make
an advance of money on the contract.
Upon this state of facts, the District Court found for the defendant; whereupon the plaintiffs moved the court for a new trial, on
the ground that the finding by the court was against both the law
and the evidence in the case, and that the finding should have been
for the plaintiffs; but the court overruled the motion, and gave
judgment for the defendant; and the plaintiffs took their bill of
exceptions, embodying the facts of the case.
It is now assigned for error, that the District Court erred in
overruling the motidn for a new trial; and also erred in rendering
judgment for the defendant.

THURSTON AND HAYS vs. LUDWIG.
.PelegBunker and James B. I.ubbell, for plaintiffs.

Stephen B. Rarris, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BARTLEY, CH. J.-The single question presented by this case, is,

whether the written contract of the parties was altered by a verbal
agreement. The written contract expressly provided for payment
for the hogs by the plaintiffs, at the time of delivery, which was to
be between the first and the fifth of March succeeding the time of
the making of the contract, on the 13th of January, 1852. It
appears, that immediately after the execution of the written contract, the defendant, Ludwig, insisted that, according to a custom
among stock dealers, he ought to have some money in advance;
and the plaintiff, Thurston, at first declined, but finally promised
the defendant that he would make him an advance of $150 or
200 about the first of February. The District .Court regarded
this verbal promise as a valid alteration of the written contract
between the parties, and as creating a condition precedent to the
obligation of the defendant to deliver the hogs. Was there error
in the action of the court in this regard?
It is well settled, as a general rule, that all parol negotiations
betweer the parties to a written contract, anterior to, or contemporancous with the execution of the instrument, are to be regarded'as
either merged in it, or concluded by it. Accordingly, it is held,
that parol evidence is incompetent to show terms or conditions at
variance with, or in addition to, a written agreement, which the
parties agreed to verbally, prior to, or at the time the contract wa
reduced to writing, but which were not inserted in the instrument.

-Powell vs. Bdmonds, 12 East, 6; Ridgway vs. Bowman, 7
Cush. 268; Small vs. Quincy, 4 Greenl. 497; Chitty on Contracts, 110. And it appears to be equally well settled, that, subsequent to the execution of a written contract, it is competent for the
parties, by a new contract, although not in .writing, either to
abandon, waive, or annul, the prior contract, or vary, or qualify
the terms of it, in any manner.. And where the verbal contract
only changes or modifies some of the terms of the original contract,
39
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it embraces, by reference, all the written stipulations of the original
undertaking, and is to be proven by the verbal agreement taken in
its connection with the written contract. But where a written contract is thus either totally abandoned and annulled, or simply
altered or modified in some of its terms, it is done, and can onlyt be
done, by a distinct and substantive contract between the parties,
founded on some valid consideration. And among the multifarious
verbal negotiations of parties in reference to their mutual stipulations in written contracts, to draw the line of distinction between
those which are valid and effectual as alterations or modifications of
the terms of written contracts, and those which are mere nuda
pacta, and, therefore, of no binding validity, requires, sometimes,
much nicety of discrimination. And it is to be regretted that the
reported adjudications bearing upon this distinction, are not all
entirely perspicuous and consistent. The general language employed
by some of the elementary authors touching this subject to the
effect that the parties to a written contract, may by parol agreement waive, abandon, or discharge a written contract, in whole or
in part, or alter or modify any of its terms, has led so)me to the
inconsiderate conclusion, that it could be done without any new and
valid consideration. This, however, is a mistake. A valid consideration is an essential and indispensable element in every binding
agreement. If a written contract be altered by verbal agreement,
such agreement must have the essential ingredients of a binding
contract; and although it may have reference to, and, indeed,
,embody the terms of the written contract, yet it must be founded on
new and distinct consideration of itself.
When the verbal agreement of parties amounts to a waiver or
discharge of mutual stipulations in a written contract, either in
whole, or in part, the discharge of each by the other, from the obligations of the contract, may furnish a sufficient consideration. For-bearance, or extrinsic considerations, may exist to furnish sufficient
legal foundation for an alteration, by verbal agreement, of the stipulations in a prior existing contract. An agreement by one person
to discharge another from the obligations of a written contract, as
a matter purely ex gratis and in the nature of a donation, would
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be of no binding validity as a mere e'ecutorV agreement, and to be
effectual, must be fully executed by an actual release, or surrender
of the contract in writing. There is a class of cases, however,
where a written contract may be altered or modified by a mere
verbal agreement of the parties, which, at its inception, or as a
mere executory agreement, would have no binding effect, yet by
being acted upon by the parties until it would woik a fraud or injuy
to refuse to carry it out, becomes binding and effectual as a contract. But a vcrbal agr ement to have the effect to alter or modify
the tciini of a prior witten contract, mu.-t be a ialid and binding'
contract of itself, resting upon some new and distinct considcraUon. And it cannot U:e sluppolted on the supposition that it is
fonded on the continuation or extension of the consideration of
the prior or written contrict, "hich was complcte of itself, and so
far as it went, fixed the iights of the parties.
In the case of Gross vs. IYugent, 5 Barn. and Adolph. 65, in
which the doctrine, that a written contract may be annulhd, or its
terms altered by subsequent verbal contract, is laid down by Lord
Dienman in the broadest language, it is not pretended that it can
be done, otherwise than by a "new contract," which, of course,
must be founded on a new and distinct consideration.
The case of Lattimore vs. 11arsen: 14 Johns. 33 0 , was a case in
which the plaintiffs, in a suit to enforce a verbal contract, had subjected themselves to a penalty for tle non-fulfilment of a written
contract ; and finding the contract a hard one, chose to pay the
pentally rather than I erform the contract, and thcreupon, the other
I amty preferriug the ful filment of the contract to the payment of
the penalty, verbally ag; eed that if thc plaintiffs would go on and
ierform the work ,they shial.l le paid thciefor iihatever it was
reasonabli worth, ith which the plaintiffs complied. Here was a
ncw and distinct contract, and l.cunded upon a new and distinct
consideration. The perf.)rm:aue of the work under the first contract wa- abandoned: and being wore beneficial to the deftudant
even than the penalty inem r(d, furnished a good consideration for
the new contract. And the court place the decision strictly on the
uidc2 ation. Substantially to the same
ground of a uzffieient 2zewr (.(
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effect is the case of Munroe v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 298, wheie one, by
an instrument under seal, agreed to erect a building for a fixed
price, which proved to be an inadequate compensation, and having
performed part of the work, refused to proceed further, -whereupon
the obligee promised, that if the party would go on and complete
the work, he should be paid for his labor and materials what they
were reasonably worth, and the work was done. Here the employer
had a right of action on the written contract which was broken ; but
he chose, in view of the benefit of the work, to make a new contract
for its performance.
And the case of Cummings vs. Arnold, 3 Motc. 486, stands
upon the same principle; also the case of Dearborn vs. (ross, 7
Cow. 48; Randolph vs. Perry, 2 Porter (Ala. R.) 376; Perrine
vs. Cheesman, 6 Halst. 177.
There is a class of cases, where parol evidence has been admitted
in connection with written evidence, where it is apparent from the
writing itself, that it does not embody the whole contract of the
parties, or where the verbal agreement is not inconsistent with, but
supplementary to the written agreement. The case of Jeffry vs.
Walton, 1 Starkie's R. 213, falls within this class, where in the hire
of a horse, a written stipulation on a card existed, merely regulating the time of hiring and the rate of payment; parol evidence was
admitted, showing additional terms in the agreement. Also Wallace
vs. Rogers, 2. N. Hamp. 506, where articles were sold accompanied
by a bill of parcels fixing the quantity, price, etc. Hoggins vs. Plympton, 11 Pick. 99; and Brodford vs; Manly, 13 Mass. R. 139, are
to the same effect. To this class, also belongs the case of White
vs. Parkin, 12 East, 582. The principle of these cases must be
distinguished from that which is applicable to the case before us.
There is a still more extensive class of cases, in which parol evidence has been admitted to vary the terms of a prior written contract, where the verbal agreement, as a mere executory contract,
would, at its inception, be wholly ineffectual, but which acquires
validity and becomes binding from having been executed or acted
on by the parties. Under the rule in this class of cases, oral evidence is admissible to show, that by subsequent agreement, the time
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for the performance has been enlarged or the place for the performance changed from that fixed by the written contract. Greenl's. E.
vol. i. sec. 304. Keating v. Price, 1 Johns. Cases, 22.
But an oral agreement to enlarge the time, or change the place
of performance fixed by a written contract, must be subsequent to
the time of the execution of the latter, and constitute an independent agreement of itself, acquiring its binding effect, either from
an existing consideration at the time, or from having been adted
upon by the parties, until it could not be disregarded by one party
without working an injury to the other party. In the case of
Lefevre vs. Lefevre, 4 Sergeant & Rawle's Rep. 241, it was held that
parol evidence was admissible to prove, that after the execution of
a deed conveying a right to a water-course through the granted
land, by courses and distances, a verbal agreement was entered into
between the parties for their mutual accommodation, altering the
route of the water-course. And this evidence was admitted expressly on the ground, that the parties had acted on the verbal
agreement, so that the original contract could no longer be enforced
without a fraud upon one party. To the same effect is Grossman
vs. Puller, 17 Pick. R. 174; also _ichardson vs. Cooper, 25 Maine
Rep. 450. Bailey vs. Johnson, 9 Cow. 115. L 1ynd vs. Beech, 7 Howard's Pr. Rep. 113.
Upon a full review of the whole subject, it appears to be well
established, that, a verbal agreement, to be effectual and binding as
an alteration of the express terms of a prior written contract
between the parties, must be supported by a new and valid consideration. And that a mere executory contract, of the kind to constitute an exception to this rule, must have been acted upon so far,
that a refusal to carry it out would work a fraud on one of the
parties.
The application of this -view of the law to the case before us,
removes all difficulty in making a satisfactory disposition of it. The
verbal promise of Thurston was manifestly unsupported by any
valid consideration, as disclosed by the evidence. The parties had
just settled the terms of their written contract, and completed the
execution of it, by which Ludwig had bound himself to deliver the
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hogs, in consideration of the undertaking of Thurston & Hays to
pay the stipulated price, at the time of delivery in March. The
time and place of payment were fixed by the express terms of the
written contract. The custom of the country, if any such actually
existed as that spoken of by Ludwig, could not have affected the
express terms of the written contract. What couceivable consideration can be assigned to support Thurston's promise as a binding
obligation ? Ludwig had not refused a compliance with the written
contract which he had just executed. Why should Thurston, except
as a mere matter of accommodation, or favor, resting in his own
discretion, promise an advance of $150 or $200 to Ludwig, one
month before the stipulated time of payment, and that too, without
security, when the terms of his written contract secured him against
any such a risk? As a consideration for this promise, Ludwig was
not required to deliver any more hogs, nor of a better quality, nor
at any other time or place, nor at a less price, nor wait any greater
length of time for the balance of the money. In short, Thurston
was to take nothing.for the fruits of his promise, to which he was
not entitled, and which he had not a right to expect at the time,
from the performance of the written contract by Ludwig. The
proposed advance, therefore, so far as the evidence discloses it, was
a naked promise of an accommodation or favor, resting in the option
of Thurston; and it appears to have been so treated by the parties
at the time. The written contract which had just been signed, was
before them when the promise of the advance was made. If intended
as a stipulation in their contract, why was it not inserted or endorsed
on the contract at the time? Why did Ludwig take his duplicate
copy of the contract, at the very time of the promised advance, and
separate from Thurston without a change in the writing, which he
carried away with him as the evidence of the agreement? And
it is not made to appear, that Ludwig ever made any request of
Thurston for the advance. On the contrary, when Thurston, about
the first of February, and near the time when the 5romised advance
was to have been made, sent his son to Ludwig to inquire about the
delivery of the hogs, instead of requesting the advance, he did not
even inquire about it, but said that he had the hogs, or the most of
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them, and would be ready to deliver them at the time specified. If
the solemn stipulations of a written contract could be altered by a
mere naked vez bal promise under such circumstances, that certainty,
which is the greatest guaranty of safety among business men, arising
out of written contracts, would be greatly weakened. And evidence
of loose and inconsiderate conversations, often not fully understood
or accurately remembered, would be resorted to in many cases, to
show waivers or variations in the stipulations of parties, with a view
of avoiding the binding obligations of written contracts.
We are unanimous in th opinion that there was error in the proceedings of the District Court.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

In th e Supreme Gourt of Vermont.
RUSSELL T. NOYES vs. JOHN SMITH AND WILLIAM R. LEE.'

1. A master is bound to exercise proper care and diligence in the selection of the
agencies and instruments with or upon which he employs his servants ; and, if
he fail to do so, he will be liable to the servant for any injuries he may sustaia
therefrom.
2. The declaration averred that the plaintiff was hired by the defendants, to have
the chrge of, and conduct and run an engine, and that by virtue of said employment. it became the duty of the defendants to furnish an engine that was well
constructed and safe, &c., but that they carelessly and wrongfully furnished an
insufficient engine; that the insufficiency was unknown totthe plaintiff, and "but
for want of all proper care and diligence, would have been known to the defendants ;" and that, while the plaintiff was in the careful and prudent use of said
engine, it exploded on account of said insufficiency, and injured the plaintiff, &o.
Hield, on demurrer, that the declaration disclosed a sufficient cause of action.

Action on the case. The declaration was as follows:
"In a plea of the case, whereupon the plaintiff declares and says,
that heretofore, to wit, on the 11 th day of November, 1853, and
for a long time before that time, the defendants were in the possession of the Vermont Central Railroad Company's track, and of all
engines, locomotives, cars, and other furniture, which had pre'2 Williams' Rep.

We are under obligation to the learned reporter, for this case.
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viously belonged to the Vermont Central Railroad Company, a corporation chartered and organized by and under a law of the legislature of the State of Vermont, and the defendants on that day, and
long before, were and had been common carriers of freight and passengers on said road; and that on the 11th day of November,
1853, the plaintiff was in the employ of the defendants, hired by
them, as an engineer, to have charge of and conduct and run an
engine on said road, for the purpose of transporting passengers and
freight on said road, and had for a long time before been such hired
servant of the defendants, in the capacity of engineer,-and that
by virtue of said employment of the plaintiff by the defendants, as
aforesaid, it became and was the duty of said defendants to furnish
an engine for the plaintiff to conduct and run, as it was his duty to
do, that was well constructed and safe to the engineer, with the use
of proper skill on his part. Yet the defendants, disregarding this
duty, to wit, on the 11th day of November, 1853, carelessly and
wrongfully gave to the plaintiff to use and conduct in drawing
freight on said road, an engine which had not before been conducted
by or known to the plaintiff, which was insufficiently stayed and
bolted around the fire box, and insufficient in divers parts ; insomuch that it greatly endangered the life of the engineer who ran
it,-all which was unknown to the plaintiff, and all which, but for
want of all proper care and diligence, would have been known to
the defendants. And the plaintiff avers that while in the careful
and prudent use and management of said engine, on his part, on the
11th day of November, 1853, on said road, said engine exploded
from the imperfection and insufficiency aforesaid, and by the explosion, the plaintiff was so torn and scalded, that he hitherto, since
that day, hath been and always will be a cripple, and wholly unable
to work, and bath been put to great expense for doctors and nurses,
to wit, $1,000, whereby and by reason of all which, an action liath
accrued to the plaintiff to have and recover his said damages, and
all he hath lost from the causes aforesaid, to his damage," &c.
To this declaration the defendants demurred, and the county
court, September term, 1855,-POLAND, J., presiding,-adjudged
the declaration insufficient. Exceptions by the plaintiff.
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P. .Dillinghamand H1. Carpenter,for the plaintiff.
Peck and Colby, for the defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered, at the circuit session in
September, 1856, by
IsAM, J.-This case comes before the court on a general

demurrer to the declaration. The plaintiff, it is averred, was
injured by the explosion of a locomotive engine, on which he was
employed by the defendants, as engineer. It is admitted that the
engine was insufficiently stayed or bolted around the fire box, and
that it was also insufficient and unsafe in other respects, but that
both parties were ignorant of those defects, and had no notice in
fact that it was in an unsafe or insecure condition. That fact is
directly averred in relation to the plaintiff, and the defendants are
not charged with any such notice by any averment in the declaration. It is averred, however, that these defects would have been
known to the defendants, but for the want of all proper care and
diligence on their part. The inquiry arises, whether the facts
stated are sufficient to enable the plaintiff to recover; it being
admitted that the plaintiff was in the exercise of proper skill and
diligence when he was injured.
The general rule seems to be well settled by the authorities, that
there is nothing growing out of the mere relation of master and
servant that raises the duty stated in the declaration. When there
is no actualnotice of defects in an engine of that character, and no
personal blame exists on the part of the master, there is no implied
obligation or contract on his part that the engine is free from
defects, or that it can safely be used by the servant. The law
imposes no such obligation. There are risks and dangers incident
to most employments, and, especially is this true, in relation to such
services as those in which the plaintiff was engaged. Those risks
the parties have in view when engagements for services are made,
and in consideration of which the rate of compensation is fixed.
In all engagements of that character, the servant assumes those
risks which are incident to his service, and, as between himself and
his master, he is supposed to have contracted on those terms. If
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an injury is sustained by the servant, in that service, it is regarded
as an accident, a mere casualty, and the misfortune must rest on
him. That is the doctrine, and the extent of the cases, to which
we were referred by the defendant's counsel. In the case of Priestly
vs. Fowler, 3 Mees. & Welsb. 1, it was held that the master was
not liable to his servant for an injury sustained by him, from the
breaking down of an overloaded van. Lord Abinger in that case
observed, that "from the mere relation of master and ,ervant no
contract, and therefore no duty, can be implied on the part of the
master to cause the servant to be safely and securely carried, or to
make the master liable for damage to the servant, arising from any
vice or imperfection unknown to the master, in the carriage or in
the mode of conducting or loading it." The same doctrine is sustained in Seymour vs. Madox, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 265, and in the
case of Couch vs. Steel, 24 Eng. L. & Eq. 77. The principle,
which is now well settled in England and this country, "that a
master is not liable to his servant for an injury occasioned by the
negligence of a fellow servant, in the course of their common
employment," is founded upon the same reason. The liability of
one servant to be injured by the carelessness of another, is a risk
which the servant has assumed, as an accident to his employment,
and for which the master is not responsible. This general rule,
however, has no application to either of those cases when there has
been actualfault or negligence on the part of the master, either in
the actfrom which the injury arose, or in the selection and employment of the agent which caused the injury. The case of Couch vs.
Steel, above cited, recognizes both the general rule and that qualification. In that case it was held, that, as there was no actual
knowledge of the defective condition of the ship, and no personal
blame was imputed to the owner, a seaman could sustain no action
for an injury sustained in consequence of its unsafe condition. The
language of the court implies, that, had there been actualknowledge
or if personal blame had otherwise been imputed to-the ship-owner,
a liability would have existed. The case of Hutchinson vs. Railway Company, 5 Wels., Hurls. & Gord. 352, is a strong illustration
of the principle. In that case, Alderson, B., after recognizing the
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general rule, that a master is not, in general, responsible to one
servant for an injury occasioned to him by the negligence of a fellow servant, observed, that "this must be taken with the qualification that the master shall have taken due care not to expose his
servant to unreasonablerisks. The servant," he observed, "when
he engages to run the risks of his service, including those arising
from the negligence of fellow servants, has a right to understand
that the master has taken reasonable care to protect him from such
risks, by associating him only with persons of ordinary skill and
care." There can be no doubt in relation to the doctrine of those
cases, or the general principles on which they are founded. The
master, in relation to fellow servants, is bound to exercise diligence
and care that he brings into his service only such as are capable,
safe and trustworthy, and for any neglect in exercising that diligence he is liable to his servant for injuries sustained from that
neglect. It is not necessary that he should know that they are
unsafe and incapable. It is sufficient that he would have known it,
if he had exercised reasonable care and diligence. The same doctrine is sustained in this country. 1 Am. L. 0. 620; 5. Wels.,
Hurls. & Gord. 357, note; Coon vs. U. & S. Bailroad Co., 6 Barber,
231. There is no distinction in principle between those cases and
the one under consideration. Upon the facts admitted by this
demurrer, whatever may be the agent which the master brings into
his service, whether animate or inanimate, the master is bound to
exercise care and prudence that those in his employment be not
exposed to unreasonable risks and dangers ;-and the servant has
a right to understand that the master will exercise that diligence in
protecting him from injury, and also in selecting the agent from
w hich it may arise. It is only such injuries as have arisen after
the exercise of that diligence and care on the part of the master,
that can properly be termed accidents or casualties, which the
servant has impliedly agreed to risk, and for which the master is
not liable. The doctrine is not controverted, that the defendants
would be liable to the plaintiff for the injury he has sustained, if
they had had notice in fact of the defective condition of the engine.
It was Eo expressly decided in the case of Keegan vs. JMestern
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Railroad Corporation,4 Selden, 175. There is no propriety, therefore, in saying that the defendants may be relieved from that
liability by a want of such knowledge, when it has arisen from their
gross neglect; for the neglect is gross, when the fact is, as is
admitted by the demurrer, that but for the want of all proper care
and diligence, the unsafe condition qf the engine would have been
Anown to them. We think, upon the facts admitted by the demurrer,
the plaintiff can sustain this action, and that the declaration is sufficient.
The judgment of the county court must be reversed, and judgment rendered for the plaintiff.1

In the -DistrictCourt of Philadelphia.
LEECH VS. SHANTZ.

1. To render a transfer of personal property valid against creditors, it was formerly
held that there must be an immediate, open and exclusive possession on the part
of the transferree ; but according to the more recent authorities the character of
the sale may be investigated as a matter of fact, and its honesty and fairness
determined by a jury.
2. Dunlap vs. Bournonvile, 26 Penn. S. R. 72, and M'Clure vs. Young, 2 W. & S.
147, cited and relied upon.

The opinion of the court, in which the facts appear, was delivered by
STROUD, J.-From the time of Clow vs. Woods, 5 S. & R. 275, to
Me Fickarvs. May, 3 Penn. S. R. 224; the first having been decided
in 1819, the second in 1846-it was held again and again, that it
was necessary, to render a transfer of personal property valid against
creditors, that it should be attended with an immediate, open, and
exclusive possession on the part of the transferree. See particularly, Cunningham vs. NYeville, 10 S.& R. 201; Babb vs. Clemson,
ibid. 419; Streepe vs. Ecikert, 2 Whart. 302; Carpentervs. Mayer,
5 Watts, 483; loffner vs. Clark, 5 Whart. 545; iHoBride vs.
Heclelland, 6 W. & S.94. Indeed, a year after the decision of
'

1 Consult 2 Selwyn's N. P., tit. " Master and Servant," 7th Am. Ed., Phila., 1857-
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3i1a Vriekar vs. May, the old doctrine was re-asserted and re-affirmed
in the fullest manner. Cadbury vs. .Arolen, 5 Penn. S. R. 320.
But this doctrine no longer obtains. What was formerly a matter
of law-to be determined by the court-is now regarded as a question of fact, in most cases, to be submitted to a jury. Dunlap vs.
Bournonville,26 Penn. S. R. 72, is the last reported case on the general subject. It presented on the trial a state of facts so clearly at
variance with the policy of the law, not only as it was formerly held
to be, but also as it was supposed it yet remained, that the president of the court before whom the cause was tried nonsuited the
plaintiff, and his opinion was fully agreed to by the whole court on
the motion to set aside the nonsuit. In the Supreme Court the
judgment was reversed.
But in the opinion of the Supreme Court, in Dunlap vs. Bour-.onviate, the judge wLo delivered it, say.-: "A mere formal or -ymbolical delivery will not avail, when an actual one is reascitably
practicable, and such is its character where the real control is
retained by the vendor, or immediately resumed by him." And
.MAcClurevs. Young, 2 W. & S. 147, is referred to as rightly decided, and as furnishing an illustration of the distinction which still
existed on this subject.
In Mclure vs. Young, a yoke of oxen which had formerly
belonged to Pettigrew were found in his possession, and seized by a
constable (Young), under an execution against him. It was proved
on the trial that Pettigrew brought the oxen to the place where
11cOlure was, and there agreed to sell them to MlcClure for a sum
of money, which he agreed to pay. About an hour after the purc"ase and delivery of the oxen to MlcClure, he agreed to let Pettig "ew take and use them until he (McOlure) should want them again.
The Supreme Court held, that upon this evidence there was no
question to be left to the jury, but the court was bound to consider
it as a question of law, and that the transaction was to be regarded
as a fraud per se.
The evidence in the case now before us seems to bring it within
ti. , principle of Young vs. McClure, as understood and explained
ii- Dunlap vs. .Bournonville. A mule, one of three, belonged to
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Shaffer. Shaffer used them in drawing a boat on the Schuylkill
canal. Leech obtained a judgment against Shaffer for $127; issued
an execution on which the sheriff seized on the three mules. The
seizure of the mules was communicated to Shaffer, then in this city.
He went to the Falls of Schuylkill, where Shantz resided, and
agreed to sell one of the mules to him for $100. Leech paid him
the money, the mule being at the time in the custody of the sheriff
at Reading. Shaffer having obtained the remainder of the money
from some other source, gave the whole to his driver, who had come
down to the Falls of Schuylkill, and he took it to Reading and
settled with the sheriff, who thereupon gave up the mules to the
driver. After the lapse of more than a week, the mules, drawing
the boat, were brought down to the Falls of Schuylkill. Leech and
Shaffer were there at the time. Shaffer took Leech to the stable
where the mules were, and pointing out the mule which he had sold
to Leech, said: "This is your mule." Leech took the mule and
ran him out on the road, and immediately brought him back. He
then said to Shaffer, " C an you do without the mule ?" Shaffer
said, "Not well." Leech replied, "Well, you can keep him, and
pay me hire for it."
A few weeks afterwards, Shantz having obtained a judgment in
this court, issued an execution, placed it in the hands of the sheriff,
who thereupon seized the mule which had been sold to Leech. The
usual course was then pursued by the sheriff, Leech having claimed
the mule as his property, and an issue directed by the court, pursuant to the sheriff's interpleader act. The evidence above stated
was given on the trial of this issue, when having heard the whole
which the plaintiff offered, I directed a nonsuit. The application
before us is to set aside this nonsait on the authority of Young vs.
McClure, which is distinctly recognized, as before stated, in Dunlap vs. Bournonville. We think the nonsuit was proper, and the
motion of the plaintiff should be dismissed.
Motion dismissed.
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In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, June, 1857.
HENRY S. 31OTT ET AL. CANAL COMMISSIONERS Vs. THE PENNSYLVANIA
RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL.
1. A State Legislature, in the absence of any express constitutional authority, has
no power to sell, surrender, alienate, or abridge, any of the rights of,sovereignty,
such as the right of taxation, so as to bind future legislatures; and any contract
to that effect is void.
2. So much of the Act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, passed May 16, 1857,
authorizing the sale of the Main Line of the Public Improvements of that State,
as provides " that if the Pennsylvania Railroad Company shall become the purchaser," they shall pay in addition to the purchase money at which it (the Main
Line) may be struck down, the sum of $1,500,00, in considcration whereof the
said Railroad Company and the Harrisburg Railroad Company shall be discharged by the Commonwealth forever" from the payment of all tonnage taxes,
and all other taxes whatever, " except for school, city, county, borough, and
township purposes," declared unconstitutional and void: and an injunction
granted to prevent the same from forming part of the terms of the sale.
3. The act in question provided that the sale should be made by the Governor;
held that as this was not part of his official duty as the Executive of the State,
but merely ministerial, the injunction might issue against him.
4. The holders of the State Loan, whether or not having a specified lien on the tolls
of the Public Works, have no right to object to a sale thereof by the State.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
C. J.-Three bills in equity have been filed, in each of which
a motion is made for an injunction to prevent the sale of the lain Line
of the Public Improvements of the State, under the Act of Assembly
of May 16, 1857. These motions draw into consideration the rights
of the Canal Commissioners, of the State creditors, of the tax payers
of the Commonwealth, and of the stockholders of the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company, to interfere in the great question involved. On
all the questions about to be decided, I proceed to deliver the unanimous opinion of the whole court.
Although there is some difference in our reasons for denying to a
dissenting stockholder who is offered compensation for his stock
by the terms of the act, the preliminary injunction asked, We all
LEwis,
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agree in refusing his motion. His rights are to be determined on
the final hearing.
*We do not consider it necessary to express any opinion on the
question whether the holder of a certificate of State loan has such
a pledge of the tolls on the State canals and railroads as could be
enforced in a court of justice. Conceding, for the purposes of the
present motion, that he has such a pledge, we are nevertheless of
the opinion that the right of a pledgee extends no further than to
require a sale of the thing pledged, and an application of the proceeds to the payment of his claim. This is what the act of Assembly proposes to accomplish. It is what a court of equity would
do, under the circumstances disclosed, if the controversy were
between private individuals. But the Legislature has the right to
prescribe remedies and change them at pleasure, so that the rights
of the parties are not materially impaired. We are perfectly satisfied
that the rights of the State creditors will not be impaired by a fair public
sale of the Main Line to the highest and best bidder, and the application of the proceeds to the payment of the State debt. On the contrary, we are bound to presume, from the evidence before us, that such
. a proceeding will be highly beneficial to the creditors of the State.
It will reduce the amount of the public debt, and render the residue
more secure. We have no right to presume that the Works will be
sold for less than their value. The creditor has therefore no case
for relief on the footing of the pledge of the tolls on the Public
Works.
But the Canal Commissioners, the tax payers and the creditor,
object to a contract of sale under which the right to punish the purchasing corporation for misuse or abuse and the right to tax
the Pennsylvania Railroad Company for State purposes and another
company for tonnage is forever extinguished. It is alleged that
the Legislature have no constitutional authority to bind succeeding
Legislatures in these particulars. If such a contract be unconstitutional and void, the Canal Commissioners are in the line of their
duty in suggesting this objection to the court, and if the court should
hold the act of Assembly void, it would be the duty of the commissioners, as faithful agents of the State, entrusted with the custody
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and management of the works, to retain possession of them for the
use of the Commonwealth, regardless of the unauthorized attempts
to deprive the public of their rights. If the Legislature have no
right to release the means on which the State and her creditors
must rely for the payment of her public debt, any creditor whose
security is about to be thus impaired, has a right to be heard in
opposition to the measure proposed. The tax-payers, whose burthens will be necessarily increased by releasing from taxation any
portion of property liable to contribute to the payment of the public debt and the expenses of government, have also an interest in
the question, and of course have a right to be heard.
A judgment of ouster against a corporation, duly put in execution, works its dissolution. According to the ancient common law,
where there is no statute provision to the contrary, upon the civil
death of a corporation all its real estate remaining unsold reverts
back to the original grantors and their heirs. The debts due to and
from the corporation are all extinguished. Neither stockholders nor
the directors nor trustees can recover debts or be charged with them
in their natural capacity. All the personal estate vests in the Commonwealth. 2 Kent's Com. 307; 1 Blacks. Com. 484. Butunder
the modern rule of equity jurisprudence, the severity of the common
law in this respect is greatly mitigated, and it is held that it is the
franchise, and not the property of the corporation that is forfeited
by a judgment of ouster, and that the property of the corporation
is a trust fund for the payment of debts and distribution among
stockholders. Wood vs. Summer, 3 Mason's Reports, 309; Adai"
vs. Shaw, 1 Sch. and Lefr. 261; M3amma vs. The Potomac Company, 8 Peters, 281; Stainton vs. The Carron Gompany, 23 L. &
1. 315; Travis vs. lHlilne, 9 Hare, 141; Bacon el al. vs. Robertson et al., 18 How. U, S. Rep. 480. The 15th section of the act
of 16th May, 1857, enables the Legislature, at their election, after
judgment of ouster, to revoke the privileges of the corporation, and
to take the roads and canals for public use, giving full compensation to the stockholders. This provision does not vary very materially from the rule which equity would adopt, independent of the
act of Assembly. It is no release of the punishment for misuse or
40
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abuse. Nor is it a release of the eminent domain under which the
corporation may be repealed, without either abuse or misuse, whenever the public interest requires it, on giving just compensation to
the stockholders. The word "may," as applied to the action of the
Legislature in this respect, is not to be construed as "shall" or
"must."
If the construction were doubtful, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the State. A corporation can never claim a
privilege against the State without showing that it is clearly entitled
to it by the terms of the charter. There is nothing in this section
which binds the Legislature to make "full compensation to the stockholders." That is only to be done if the Legislature should, by
legislative act, revoke the privileges granted; but there is no obligation, on their part to pass any act of revocation. If this should
not be done, the judgment of ouster, with all its legal and equitable
incidents, would remain in full force. There is, therefore, no release of the right to punish for misuse or abuse, nor any release of
the eminent domain in the provisions contained in the 15th section
of the act of Assembly.
We now come to the vital question involved in these applications.
The act of Assembly of 16th May, 1857, makes provision for a
public sale, and, for the purpose of inviting competition, directs
that public notice of the time and place be given in one or more
newspapers of extended circulation, published in the cities of Philadelphia, Pittsburg, Washington, Boston, New York and in the
borough of Harrisburg. It authorizes "any person or persons, or
railroad or canal company now incorporated, or which may hereafter be incorporated under the laws of this Commonwealth, to become the purchasers for any sum not less than seven million five
hundred thousand dollars." But there is a proviso in the 3d section, which declares that "if the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
shall become the purchasers at the said public sale or by assignment,
they shall pay, in addition to the purchase money at which it may
be struck down, the sum of one million five hundred thousand dollars, and, in consideration thereof, the said railroad company, and
the Harrisburg, Mount Joy and Lancaster Railroad Company shall
be discharged by the Commonwealth forever, from the payment of
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all taxes upon tonnage or freight carried over said railroads, and
the said Pennsylvania Railroad Company shall also be released from
the payment of all other taxes or duties on its capital stock, bonds,
dividends or property, except for school, city, county, borough, or
township purposes." The amount of taxes proposed to be released
is beyond calculation. It can only be conjectured. It would be
greatly increased by the tax which would of course be levied on the
property about to be sold to the company. Judging from the increase during the last five years, and the constant augmentation of
commerce and travel along the route, it would seem reasonable to
believe that in five years from this time it would be double its present amount. But conceding that the tax to be released will hereafter amount to no more, per annum, than the sum paid in 1856,
the amount, according to the admission of the railroad company
itself, would be $280,739 21 per annum forever. This sum is more
than equal to the interest on $5,600,000 at 5 per cent., the rate to
be charged to the purchasers. In other words, the act of Assembly proposes to give to the railroad company a consideration equal
to $5,600,000 for $1,500,000, and thus to give that company an
advantage equal to $4,100,000 over every other bidder at the sale.
By means of this privilege, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company
may drive from the field of competition all other bidders. It is
essential to every fair public auction, that all the bidders shall
stand upon an equal footing.
If the object had been to make a fair sale of this portion of the
State revenue, it might have been evinced by a provision for the
transfer of it to the highest bidder, without any distinction in favor
of any one. But this was not done. The extraordinary yroviso in
favor of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, is partial, and entirely repugnant to the general intent of the act, and if allowed to
stand, the sale under it will furnish the most magnificent exhibition of a "mock auction" that the world has ever witnessed.
We rejoice to say that the highly respectable and upright officers
of the corporation disclaim: in the most solemn manner, under
oath, all agency in procuring the enactment in question.
But has the Constitution conferred upon the Legislature the author-
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ity to extinguish,forever, by bargain and sale, the power to raise revenue for the support of the government? All free governments are
established by the people for their benefit, and the powers delegated
are to be exercised for their common good, and not, under any circumstances, to be sold or destroyed, so long as the nations establishing
them have the physical power to maintain their independence. Individuals cannot subsist without food. Deprive them of the "means
whereby they live," and you destroy them as certainly as if you did
it by shedding their blood. The necessities of governments are as
great as those of individuals. No government can exist without
revenues to defray its expenses and support its officers and agents.
The revenue is the food indispensable to its existence. Deprive it
of this and you strip it of all power to perform its duties, bring it
into contempt by its helplessness and uselessness, and ultimately
destroy it as effectually as if it were overturned by domestic violence, or subjugated by the conquest of a foreign foe. Government
is but an aggregation of individual rights and powers. It has no
more right to commit political suicide than an individual has to destroy the life given by his Creator. Contracting away the taxing
power in perpetuity tends, as we have seen, inevitably to the destruction of the government. If twelve or twenty millions of taxable property may be released to-day, one hundred millions may be
released to-morrow; and, the principle being established, the process might go on until all power to raise revenue was gone. If this
did not destroy the government, it would result in something infinitely more dangerous to the liberties of the people. It would make
it the servile dependent of the wealthy corporation or individuals to
whom it contracted away its means of support. Although the taxing power is an incidental one, to be exercised only as the necessary
means of performing governmental duties, it is nevertheless a branch
of the legislative power, which always in its nature implies not
only the power of making laws, but of altering and repealing them
as the exigencies of the State and circumstances of the times may
require. Rutherforth's Institutes of Natural Law, b. 3, oh. 3, s. 3. If
one portion of the legislative power may be sold, another may be disposed of in the same way. If the power to raise revenue may be sold
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to-day, the power to punish for crimes may be sold to-morrow, and the
power to pass laws for the redress of civil rights may be sold the
next day. If the legislative power may be sold, the executive and
judicial powers may be put in the market with equal propriety. The
result to which the principle must inevitably lead, proves that the
sale of any portion of governmental power is utterly inconsistent
with the nature of our free institutions, and totally at variance with
the object and general provisions of the constitution of the State.
It may be urged that we must confide in the fidelity of the Legislature, and that there is every ground for hope that they would not
carry such measures to an unreasonable length. This is no answer
to the argument. It is a question of constitutional authority and
not a case of confidence at all. Limitations of power established
by written consiitutions have their origin in a distrust of the infirmity of man. That distrust is fully justified by the history of
the ris&.and fall of nations.
But, conceding that this practice will not be carried so far as to
distroy the government, is there any warrant for it to the extent to
which the act of Assembly proposes to go in the present case? It
was held by this court, in Hood's Estate, 9 Harris, 114, that "the
duties of sovereign and subject are reciprocal, and the person who
is p'rotected by a government in his person or property, may be
compelled to pay for that protection. As taxes are to be assessed
for the sole purpose of supporting the government, the propriety of
exacting them, the persons and property to be made liable, and the
rules for their assessment and collection are to be determined by its
authority. It is, however, a rule of the public law, founded on a
principle of justice which no government can disregard without violating the rights of its citizens, that taxes shall be assessed in such
manner that all the citizens may pay their quota, in proportion to
their abilities and the advantages they derive from the society." 9
Harris, 114; 10 Harris, 497. This principle is sanctioined by writers of the highest authority-Vattel, b. 1, ch. 20, s. 240 ; Rutherforth's Inst, of Nat. Law, b. 2, ch. 3,s. 5; Puffendorf's Law of
Nations,-b. 7, ch. 9, s. 10. It is expressly declared by Baron Puffendorf, that "no immunities or exceptions," (from taxation) ought
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to be "granted to certain persons to the defrauding or oppressing of
the rest." It is upon this principle that, when the private property
of the citizen is taken for public use, just compensation is to be
made to him out of the common fund, in order that the contribution to the public interest may fall in a just proportion upon each
citizen. Rutherforth, b. 2, ch. 3,s. 5. As the Legislature are necessarily the judges of the method of assessing taxes, it is to be
presumed that they have regarded the rule of contribution sanctioned by justice and the equal rights of the citizen; and their enactments are not always subject to judicial review. Where they make
appropriations to institutions of learning or charity, or grant lands
or pensions to persons who have served in the defence of the nation, it is presumed to be a compensation for the good that has
been done or is to be done to the community. Where they grant
to the same institutions or individuals an exemption from taxation,
such grants, for the same reason, are not regarded as a violation of
the rules of justice and equality, so long as there is no contract
which may tie the hands of succeeding legislatures against repealing such exemptions; and so long as they are not repealed, they
seem to have been enforced as a legitimate exercise of legislative
power. 1 S. & R. 62; 6 Watts, 435.
Bat where there is no pretence of an intention to equalize the
taxation among the people, but an avowed purpose to sell to one
class of citizens an exemption from all taxes forever, and thus to
throw all the public burthens upon the other, for all time to come,
it is, to all intents and purposes, imposing a tax upon them without
the consent of their representatives, and is such a plain, palpable
and open violation of the rights and liberties of the people-such
a clear case of transcending the just limits of legislative power,
that the judiciary is bound to pronounce such an act null and void.
No class of corporations stand more in need of the protection of
the government, or occupy more of the time of the legislature and
the courts of justice, or occasion more expense to the public than
railroad corporations. From the extensive nature of their operations, from the exercise of the power to take private property for
the construction of their works, and their continual collision with
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each other's interests, and with the interests of individuals and municipal communities, they require the constant and the energetic
protection of the strong arm of the government. Withdraw that
protection and they would be left to the mercy of popular outbreaks,
manifesting themselves by opposition to their progress and the destruction of their works whenever the location of their roads or
their depots, or any of their numerous and necessary operations
come in conflict with the interests of particular localties. These
corporations should be .the last to consent that the government
should be enfeebled by the diminution of its revenue, or to ask
that it should be bound to exert all its energies, and incur large and
constant expenditures for their protection, while they are exempt
from contributing their share.
These principles are not so infirm as to stand in need of the staff
of authority for support. They are the result of that liberty and
equality which was established by the revolutionary struggle of our
ancestors. They are perfectly understood by every one 'who has
capacity to comprehend the nature of our free institutions. They are
deeply impressed on the hearts of the people, and they are fully recognized by the history, the objects and the language of our State
constitution.
The case of NYew Jersey vs. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164, is cited in
opposition to this doctrine. It was decided without argument on
the part of the State. It has relation altogether to the power of
the colonial government, by treaty with the remnant of a tribe of
Indians, who released lands claimed by them, in consideration of
the grant of other lands free from taxation. The Indians occupied
in some respects the condition of a separate nation. Nations are
frequently obliged, for the sake of the public peace, to make concessions to each other, which would not be justified if the transaction were between a State and individuals; and the rules which
govern in the construction of the treaty making power, do not apply to ordinary contracts. But it is a sufficient answer to this case
to say, that the powers of the colonial government of New Jersey,
before our free governments were established by the Revolution of
1776, furnish no rule whatever for ascertaining the powers of the
Legisture of Pennsylvania, under our present constitution.
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In the case of Gordon vs. The Appeal Tax Court, 8 How. 142,
it was "admitted by the attorney-general of the State of Maryland, that there was a contract between that State and the Banks,
and that it was protected" by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The question of the constitutional power of the Legislature to contract away the taxing power was therefore neither
raised nor decided. If it had been, the question would have had
relation to the powers conferred by the constitution of Maryland,
and not to those delegated by that of Pennsylvania.
The case of Hardy vs. Waltham, 7 Pick. 110, was that of an
exemption granted by the old colonial ordinance of Massachusetts
of 1650, and subsequently confirmed by the people in their State
constitution. A decision affirming the power of the people, when
establishing their constitution, to confirm an exemption from taxa-"
tion granted to a college by an ancient colonial law, has nothing
whatever to do with the question involved in this case. That the
people themselves possess this power has never been doubted. All
power emanates from them. But it is denied that they have in this
State granted any such power to the Legislature.
In Atwater vs. Woodbridge, 6 Conn. Rep, 223, and in Seylmour
vs. .Hartford, 21 Conn. Rep. 481, the question of the right of the
Legislature to contract away the taxing power so as to bind future
Legislatures, did not arise, because the subsequent enactments were
not construed or understood as a repeal of the exemptions previously granted. The intimations of the judge in delivering the
opinion in the last mentioned case, that such a power had been
judicially sanctioned, go for little, particularly when we see that he
deplores the exercise of such a "high act of legislative power," and
declares the intention of the court "not further to extend this exemption from taxation." The progress of the age and the experience of government enable it to see and correct the errors committed during its youth and inexperience.
In Brewster vs. Hough, 10 New Hampshire Rep. 188, it was
held that "the power of taxation is essentially a power of sovereignty or eminent domain ;" and Chief Justice Parker, in delivering the opinion of the court, questions the power of the Legislature

CANAL COMMISSIONERS vs. PENNSYLVANIA R. R. COMPANY.

633

to make a contract by which it shall be surrendered without express
authority for that purpose in the constitution. He held that there
is "a material difference between the right of a Legislature to grant
lands, or corporate powers' or money, and a right to grant away the
essential attributesof sovereignty. These," he adds, "1do not seem
to furnish the subject matter of a contract." In these views we
fully concur. The attribution of power by the States to the Union
is not in conflict with this principle, for the act of Union is but an
enlargement of the political society for certain described purposes,
and the power of taxation that passed to the federal government
was but a natural and necessary sequence of it. It was not extinguished by contract, but merely transferred to another portion of
government to be exercised for the general welfare under the
limitations prescribed.
In general, the State courts have avoided expressing an opinion
on this momentous question, where the necessities of the case did
not require it. The cases, which have arisen, have generally been
disposed of by holding that "exemptions are binding until repealed
by subsequent legislation"-that "no charter or grant carries with
it such exemption unless clearly expressed"-that "the taxing
power is of vital importance and is essential to the existence of
government"-that it is "a part of the power of legislation"-that
"it resides in a government as part of itself," and that "the release
of it is never to be assumed." Most of these principles are announced by Chief Justice Marshall, in the providence Bank vs.
Billings, 4 Pet. 561, 562, 563, and recognized by many decisions in
this and other States. 10 Barr, 442; 12 Harris, 232 ; 10 Harris,
496. But the question has beeii distinctly decided against the existence of any such power five different times by the unanimous
judgment of all the judges of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Debolt
vs. The Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, 1 Ohio State
Reports, 563; The Toledo Bank vs. The City of Toledo, Ibid, 623;
31echanics' and Traders' Branch Bank vs. Debolt, Ibid, 591 ; The
Milan and Rutland Plank Road Company vs. Eusted, 3 Ohio
State Reports, 578 ; The -horwalkPlank Road Company vs. Busted, 3 Ohio State Reports, 5E(6. In one of these cases, it -was de-
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clared that the Legislature had not the constitutional authority to
abridge or in any manner whatever surrender any portion of the
right of taxation, and that this question had been settled by solemn
adjudication, and is not now an open question in that State. 3
Ohio State Rep. 581. It is true that the Supreme Court of the
United States has taken a different view of the question, and has in
several cases, reversed the decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
-PiquaBank vs. Knoop, 16 How. 369 ; Mfechanics' and Traders'
'Bank vs. Debot, 18 How. 380; Same vs. Thomas, Ibid, 384;
Dodge vs. Moolsey, Ibid, 331.
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, on the
construction of the constitution or laws of the United States, are
binding on the State courts. The decisions of the Supreme Courts
of the several States, on the construction of the constitution and
laws of their respective States, are in like manner binding on the
Supreme Court of the United States. That court has no more right
to overrule the judgment of a State court on a question of State law,
than the State court has to overrule the United States court on a
question of United States law. All contracts are to be construed
and understood according to the law of the place where they are
made and to be performed. The laws and constitution of a State
are to be construed and understood everywhere according to the
judicial construction which they receive in the State where they are
made and are to operate. This is the rule of jurisprudence which
prevails throughout the civilized world. It is the rule which always
ought to govern, and which generally does- govern the Supreme
Court of the United States. Wherever there is a departure from
it, the necessary result is to impair public confidence in that exalted
tribunal and to introduce disastrous confusion into the administration of the law. It cannot be expected that the judges of the federal court shall be as familiar with the constitution, laws and usages
of Ohio, as the Supreme Judges of that State, who reside within
her limits-who have been chosen on account of their acquaintance
with her laws, and whose especial business it is. to expound them.
The decision of the highest judicial tribunal in a State, on the construction of the State constitution, or a State law, is authoritative
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everywhere, when the same question arises, because it is pronounced
by the only tribunal having direct and immediate jurisdiction over
the question. The decision of the United States court on the same
point, where it incidentally arises, is not authority elsewhere, because
it has no direct and immediate jurisdiction over the question. Its
duty is to receive the State law as it is expounded in the tribunal of
the last resort in the State. These views furnish a plain rule for
estimating the value of the conflicting decisions which have been
cited. We have no hesitation in adopting the decisions of the
State courts on all questions respecting the meaning of their own
State constitutions, and the extent of the powers which the people
of the States have therein granted to the different departments of
their own State governments. It may be added that the United
States court was divided in opinion on this question. Three eminent judges of that court dissenting, while the State court was
unanimous. And it is but just to say that the opinions of the State
court are sustained by a course of argument which has never been
satisfactorily answered in the United States courts, o elsewhere.
Chief Justice Taney, in maintaining the opinion of the United
States Court, admits that that court "always follows the decisions
of the State courts in the construction of their own constitution and
laws ;" but he adds that, "where those decisions are in conflict, the
United States Court must decide between them ;" and he then puts
the decision on 'the ground that the alleged contract was made
"under a construction in favor of its validity, which had been undisputed for nearly fifty years by every department of the government, and supported by judicial construction." 16 How. 431. If
these were the facts of the case, we find no fault with the decision,
except that the State court, and not the federal court, was the proper
tribunal to pronounce it. We have no sympathies with States or
individuals who desire to break engagements entered into with their
agents, on the ground that the latter have transcended their
authority, after the principals, by acquiescence and encouragement,
have induced unsuspecting parties to enter into such engagements,
and invest their money on the faith of them. Common justice
requires every principal to disavow the act of an agent who exceeds
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his authority, the moment it is known. But, in the case now before
us, there has been neither encouragement nor acquiescence. The
unauthorized act was openly and promptly disavowed and opposed,
in the mode pointed out by the constitution and the laws, the moment
that an attempt was made to give it the form of a contract.
It is objected that the governor is not subject to this form of our
jurisdiction. It is far from our intention to claim the power to control him in any matter resting in executive discretion. But the rule
of law seems to be, that when the Legislature proceeds to impose on
an officer duties which are purely ministerial, he may be coerced by
mandamus or restrained by injunction, as the rights of the parties
interested may require. In such a case, no individual in the land,
however high in power, can claim to be above the law. This rule
is sustained by the case of Marbury vs. iadison, 1 Oranch, 137;
Griffith vs. Cochran, 5 Bin. Rep. 87; Commonwealth vs. Cochran,
6 Bin. 456; Commonwealth vs. Cochran, 1 S. & R. 473. It seems
to us that the sale of the property of the State at auction is not a
part of the governor's constitutional duty as chief magistrate. It
is very probable that the Legislature have no power to impose any
such duty upon him. But if he consents to perform a ministerial
act, the judicial power to administer justice and restrain against
acts contrary to law, cannot thereby be ousted or evaded. And if
it be shown that the act under which he claims authority to dispose
of the public property, or to divest private rights, is unconstitutional
and void, he may, of course, like any other individual, be restrained
from proceeding. But we have too much respect for the office to
resort to this measure unnecessarily, and quite too much respect
for the incumbent to suppose that any such proceeding will be
necessary after the opinion of the court is pronounced.
There is no constitutional objection to the repeal of the tonnage
tax, or any other tax, whenever the Legislature, in the exercise of
their discretion, shall think proper to pass such a law. The objecjection is to the sale of the taxing power in such a way as to put
the resources of the State out of the reach of future Legislatures,
should the public necessities require a resort to them.
There is no legal objection to the sale of the Main Line, nor to
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the right of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to become a competitor and purchaser, upon equal terms with any other person
or corporation. The objection is to that part of the proviso
in the third section of the act of 16th May, 1857, which requires
the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to bid $1,500,000 more than
any other bidder, and in consideration thereof proposes to release
the said company, and also the Harrisburg, Mount Joy and Lancaster
Railroad Company forever, from the taxes therein stated. The
injunction is to be awarded merely to prohibit a sale of the Public
Works upon these terms. All other parts of the act are constitutional, and there is nothing to prevent a sale to the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company, or any other corporation or person or persons,
under the GENERAL provisions of the act.
ORDER.

It is ordered that, upon the complainants, or either of them, filing
a bond in the penal sum of one thousand dollars, with sufficient
sureties, to be approved by this court, or any judge thereof, conditioned to indemnify the defendants from all damages that may be
sustained by the injunction granted on this motion, an injunction
be awarded, commanding the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and
its officerg and agents, named as defendants in this bill, to make no
bid for the purchase of the Main Line of the Public Works under
that part of the proviso in the third section of the act of 16th May,
1857, which requires the said company to pay, in addition to the
purchase money at -which the works may be struck down, the sum of
one and a half millions of dollars, and ;n consideration thereof
assumes to discharge forever the said railroad company, and also the
Harrisburg, Portsmouth, Mount Joy and Lancaster Railroad Company from the payment of all taxes upon tonnage and freight over
said railroads; and also to release the said Pennsylvania Railroad
Company from the payment of all other taxes or duties on its capital stock, bonds, dividends or property, except for school, city,
county, borough or township purposes. And also commanding the
said Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and its officers and agents
aforesaid, strictly to allstain from accepting any assignment on the

